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TTIP and the ‘Finance Exception’: venue-shopping and the 
breakdown of financial regulatory coordination  
Erik Jones and Huw Macartney 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper asks why financial market regulatory coordination did not form a major part 
of the US and EU negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP). Given the highly interconnected nature of transatlantic financial services, 
common experiences of insufficient regulation exposed by the global financial crisis, the 
G20 commitments made by both blocs, and the awareness that uncoordinated re-
regulation could threaten global financial stability, the US and the EU arguably had every 
incentive to make financial services a central pillar of the TTIP. Yet financial services 
coordination is conspicuous by its absence. We argue that the breakdown in financial 
coordination was driven by the fact that US authorities’ moved more quickly and in ways 
less appreciated by major actors in the financial sector than their EU counterparts in 
implementing the G20 agenda. This has given rise to ‘venue-shopping’ on the part of the 
largest financial firms. Rather than try to tackle US regulatory agencies head-on, they 
hope to gain traction on the US regulatory process by influencing how European partners 
approach contentious issues. We conclude that where we used to worry that firms would 
shop the lightest regulatory environment, now there is concern that they will shop the 
most porous lobbying arena.  
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Introduction  
This paper asks why further financial integration did not form part of US and EU 
negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that opened in 
2013. Financial integration is deeper between the United States and Europe than between 
any two other regions of the world. The principal firms have dominant roles in both 
markets. US and EU firms make up the majority of the world’s largest banks by market 
capitalization (see Table 1). The euro-dollar exchange rate is the world’s most traded 
base pair and almost all currency transactions move into or out of either the dollar or the 
euro. Moreover, much of this activity is in the service of integration in the areas of 
transatlantic trade and investment; US and European banks are more exposed to each 
other than to other parts of the world (see Table 2). Hence financial integration would 
seem a natural area for transatlantic regulatory partnership — particularly if the goal is to 
eliminate non-tariff barriers through the promotion of new global standards. 
Nevertheless, finance seems likely to remain outside the TTIP conversation.  
 
Table 1: Origins of world’s largest banks (by total assets US$ tn) 
Rank Bank Home Country Total assets ($ tn) 
1 Industrial and Commerce Bank of 
China 
China 3.18 
2 HSBC Holdings UK 2.76 
3 China Construction Bank 
Corporation 
China 2.60 
4 BNP Paribas France 2.59 
5 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan 2.51 
6 JP Morgan Chase & Company US 2.48 
7 Agricultural Bank of China China 2.47 
8 Bank of China China 2.44 
9 Credit Agricole Group France 2.35 
10 Barclays PLC UK 2.67 
11 Deutsche Bank Germany 2.25 
12 Bank of America US 2.15 
13 Japan Post Bank Japan 1.97 
14 Citigroup Inc. US 1.89 
15 Societe Generale France 1.74 
16 Misuho Financial Group Japan 1.71 
17 Royal Bank of Scotland Group UK 1.70 
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18 Banco Santander Spain 1.61 
19 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Japan 1.57 
20 Groupe BPCE France 1.57 
21 Wells Fargo US 1.55 
22 Lloyds Banking Group UK 1.40 
23 China Development Bank China 1.32 
24 UniCredit S.p.A. Italy 1.16 
25 UBS AG Switzerland 1.11 
Source:  http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/assets 
 
 
Table 2: Foreign Exposure of US and European Banks 
Percentages European 
Banks 
United States 
Total Foreign Exposure 100 100 
Developed Europe 47 42 
Developing Europe 7 3 
United States 20 0 
Japan 2 9 
China 2 3 
Offshore Centers 8 17 
ROW 15 26 
 
 
There are three potential explanations for the conspicuous absence of financial 
integration in TTIP:  the first is that post-crisis financial coordination was simply taking 
place in alternative fora, meaning that its insertion into TTIP would have been surplus to 
requirements; a second explanation places the emphasis instead on rival firms and 
protectionism. Here the argument would be that large financial institutions on both sides 
of the Atlantic lobbied their domestic (US) or regional (EU) authorities to demand that 
further integration remain outside of the TTIP conversation as a mechanism for 
protecting their market share and interests. A third explanation however, highlights the 
competition between regulatory authorities.  Such competition could play out in many 
ways, through a mutual attempt to preserve independence or some effort by one 
regulatory authority to gain influence over the other.  
This paper follows this third explanation. Specifically, we argue that US financial 
regulators – the US Treasury in particular – refused to allow finance to become part of 
the TTIP negotiations because they worried that any movement toward regulatory 
convergence would come at the expense of their independence and could result in the 
lowering of their standards. Importantly though, US fears were informed by the 
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impression that the European regulatory process was more susceptible to interference 
from large financial institutions.  
This argument is not pieced together by forensic deduction.  Indeed, Treasury officials 
make the point explicitly in conversation.1 So do representatives of U.S. business 
interests in Europe who support including financial services in the TTIP conversation.2 
The same business representatives also insist that a chapter on financial services could be 
slipped into any agreement at the last minute – which is how they expect the negotiations 
to unfold. Hence the importance of the argument is not so much what it tells us about the 
latest round of trans-Atlantic negotiations but rather what is says about attempts to 
promote global (financial) governance (see also Germain, this issue).  
Within the wider context of market integration, this case study reveals an interesting 
aspect in venue shopping – which is the attempt by firms to choose the regulator who will 
treat them in the most advantageous manner.  Where we used to worry that firms would 
shop the least restrictive regulatory environment, now there is concern that they will shop 
the most porous lobbying arena – meaning, the one where they can have the greatest 
influence over the regulatory process. It also reveals the different dimensions of trust that 
are required – both in market institutions and in political institutions. In other words, the 
treatment of finance in the TTIP stands in stark contrast to the treatment of trade and 
investment: negotiations over trade and investment have been characterized by an almost 
unprecedented level of trust and willingness for regulatory engagement and cooperation; 
meanwhile, the absence of finance from the conversation smacks of mistrust and 
independence on the part of the US authorities. Simply, financial stability concerns 
continue to dominate the post-crisis transatlantic financial regulatory process, with all the 
corresponding costs to market access and integration.  
Our argument unfolds in four stages. First, we map the TTIP negotiations to show how 
finance was systematically excluded. In the second section we then briefly consider the 
two potential alternative explanations, that financial coordination was being dealt with in 
alternative fora and that rival firms had demanded the financial exclusion. In the third and 
main section of the paper we then provide evidence to support our claim that competing 
regulatory regimes and US opposition was the main explanation for the finance 
exception. We do this by (i) process-tracing US opposition, and by (ii) mapping post-
crisis regulatory reforms to explain that the US moved more quickly and in ways less 
attractive to large banks than the EU. In the fourth section we then examine the evidence 
of venue-shopping by the largest firms.  
 
The finance exception? 
This first section maps the TTIP negotiations to support the claim of a finance exception 
in TTIP. At the Transatlantic Economic Council (28 November 2011), Senior EU and US 
leaders agreed to strengthen their cooperation on customs procedures, electric vehicles, 
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and new technologies in cloud computing.  It was also agreed to strengthen cooperation 
aimed at supporting small and medium sized enterprises international trade; and 
increased cooperation in the field of investment, particularly with regards to barriers in 
third countries. The Council noted though that the premise for increased cooperation in 
trade and investment sprung from the fact that the EU and the US enjoyed the most 
integrated economic relationship in the world: for both goods and services the two 
regions were each other’s biggest trading partners.3  
This summit resulted in the establishment of the EU-US High Level Working Group on 
Jobs and Growth.  The purpose of the group was to look for opportunities for the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers and the promotion of compatible or common regulatory 
standards in order not only to stimulate economic performance but also to address issues 
of ‘common concern’ and to promote the achievement of ‘shared economic goals’.  This 
working group quickly came to the conclusion that the best way forward would be a 
comprehensive transatlantic agreement to facilitate the trade in goods and services, to 
foster investment, and to promote regulatory convergence.  Acting on this 
recommendation, U.S President Barrack Obama announced his intention to open talks on 
a ‘transatlantic trade and investment partnership’ in his 12 February 2013 ‘state of the 
union’ address.  
The first round of TTIP negotiations was then held in Washington (8th-12th July 2013). 
According to official sources the aim was to ‘liberalize as much as possible trade and 
investment between the two blocs’.4 Of particular interest for the purpose of this article 
however, was the fact that even at this early stage both sets of authorities recognized that 
the goal was more than just removing barriers. They acknowledged that the main hurdles 
lay ‘behind the border’ in regulations, nontariff barriers, and red tape. The conclusion 
was the need to reinforce regulatory cooperation, ‘so as to create converging 
regulations’.5 In other words, the strategic importance to both sides of access to each 
other’s markets manifested in a mutual agreement for regulatory convergence; and this 
level of agreement would fundamentally shape the unfolding TTIP negotiations. 
Strangely though, financial services were already conspicuously absent from the range of 
issues on the table at this July 2013 Summit. 
To understand why the absence of finance is so glaring, it is necessary to back up a bit in 
the chronology.  The High Level Working Group was always vague in its reports about 
what sectors would be included under the headings ‘goods’ and ‘services’.  Ultimately, 
different stakeholders would have to nominate (or self-nominate) different sectors for 
inclusion in the talks.  In autumn 2012 EU and US authorities issued a call for input on 
regulatory issues to be considered part of the possible future trade agreement. Of the 52 
respondents on either side of the Atlantic, only one submission represented financial 
institutions (the Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, the German Banking Federation). 
The BdB expressed its unqualified support for including financial regulation issues in any 
negotiations on a comprehensive EU/US agreement to further liberalized transatlantic 
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trade and investment.6 They also noted that the US remains the most important financial 
market outside of the EU and hence, for German banks, US rules were highly important. 
In particular, they emphasized the need to apply principles of national treatment (i.e. 
competitive equality) and recognition of comparable home country standards when 
regulating US operations of EU banks (and vice versa). The German association also 
noted though that emerging US financial regulations had raised concerns, particularly 
because of the way in which they had been independently pursued.7 We will return to this 
theme in our third section on the US post-crisis reform process. 
These firm-level responses fed into the Final Report of the High Level Working Group 
on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) (11th February 2013). Yet again however, financial 
integration and cooperation remained conspicuously absent from the official text. The 
final report noted that the EU and US would seek to reach bilateral agreement in the 
following areas: customs and trade facilitation; competition policy; state-owned 
enterprises; local barriers to trade; raw materials and energy; small and medium sized 
enterprises; and transparency.8 Indeed, as the first round of TTIP negotiations took shape, 
finance remained – at best – peripheral. For example, of the 162 organizations that 
registered for the debriefing meeting after the first round of EU-US negotiations, only 
one organization (the European Banking Federation) represented financial services. Yet 
from the minutes of this debriefing it became apparent that finance had indeed been 
discussed in the context of regulatory issues.9  
Following the second round of negotiations (11th-15th November 2013), a separate 
meeting on financial services regulation was organized.10 Part of the reason was that a 
large number of stakeholders had raised questions about the status and progress of 
discussions related to financial services.11 Then, in January 2014, the EU Commission 
revisited financial services integration under the broad preamble of cooperation on 
regulatory issues. This was a key turning point for Europe, as EU authorities became 
more determined. In a position paper they emphasized the global nature of financial 
services and the need for cooperation to reduce systemic risk.12 The position paper 
highlighted that although regulatory dialogue had indeed taken place in a variety of fora, 
these principles had not been applied consistently in the two related jurisdictions. Some 
of this inconsistency was attributable to different EU and US market structures. But the 
position paper also noted that ‘in too many instances, international standards have been 
implemented in a way that does not allow regulatory systems and the relevant regulators 
and supervisors to work together’.13  
Indeed as the negotiations continued in 2014, financial services continued to be a theme 
for discussion in the EU Commission’s TTIP Stakeholder Advisory Group.14 At the 
January meeting for example the advisory group raised the question of how cooperation 
in this area could be addressed. Nevertheless, by the May meeting, the Chair – 
Commissioner Ignacio Garcia-Bercero noted that ‘the EU and the US still [had] different 
views on inclusion of financial services’ in TTIP15 – even though the EU Commission 
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began ‘lobbying hard for such services to be included in the TTIP negotiations’.16 Put 
simply, while financial services remained a consistent theme amongst European 
stakeholders and – as we will later show – European and US banks, it gained little 
traction in the EU-US negotiations. 
These stakeholders have a good reason for focusing attention on trans-Atlantic finance.  
The North Atlantic is the most integrated part of the global financial marketplace.  
Successive surveys of cross-border capital flows by the McKinsey Global Institute show 
both the extent and the longevity of this predominance.17 They also show the potential 
volatility that the trans-Atlantic financial marketplace can introduce into the global 
economy.  The recent financial crisis reduced cross border capital movements ‘from 
$10.9 trillion in 2007 to just $1.9 trillion in 2008 and to $1.6 trillion in 2009’ (see Table 
3).18   
 
Table 3: Change in European and US Foreign Exposure from 2009 to 2014. 
 
 2009 2014 Change (2014-2009) 
US Dollar 
Trillions 
European 
Banks 
United 
States 
European 
Banks 
United 
States 
European 
Banks 
United 
States 
Total 
Foreign 
Exposure 
20.33 2.71 17.12 3.20 -3.21 0.48 
Developed 
Europe 
10.92 1.37 7.97 1.36 -2.95 -0.02 
Developing 
Europe 
1.30 0.06 1.14 0.10 -0.17 0.04 
United 
States 
3.87 0.00 3.42 0.00 -0.45 0.00 
Japan 0.54 0.28 0.35 0.29 -0.19 0.00 
China 0.12 0.05 0.37 0.08 0.25 0.03 
Offshore 
Centers 
1.24 0.27 1.33 0.55 0.09 0.27 
ROW 2.34 0.68 2.55 0.83 0.21 0.15 
 
 
This collapse in cross-border capital flows was largely a result of heightened perceptions 
of counter-party risk in inter-bank markets.  Such perceptions tend to be self-fulfilling.  
Banks that depend upon inter-bank lending to meet their funding requirements quickly 
come up short once inter-bank markets run dry.  Hence there is a strong incentive for 
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic not only to strengthen their supervision of 
systemically important financial institutions but also to create the impression that their 
supervision is effective.19  
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The problem is that U.S. and European regulators have responded to the crisis in an 
uncoordinated fashion and by strengthening differences across the Atlantic.20 We explore 
the substantive disagreements below.  For this stage of the argument, the important issue 
is the extent to which regulatory differences have impacted on the trans-Atlantic trade in 
financial services.  The evidence is mixed and distorted in many ways by the ongoing 
crisis in the euro area.  Nevertheless, industry analysts – both at McKinsey and elsewhere 
– argue that divergence in regulatory responses to the crisis could hinder recovery in 
cross-border capital markets.  Worse, there is concern that ‘diversity [will lead to] 
arbitrage, severely reduced liquidity, new and unintended risk distributions caused purely 
by regulation and subsequent additional regulation’.21 Our aim in this article is not to 
determine whether the US or the EU’s regulatory response was substantively ‘better’. 
Instead, our aim is to highlight that the divergence in response has created openings for 
potentially highly damaging regulatory arbitrage driven by financial firm venue 
shopping.  
 
Competing explanations 
This second section of the paper examines two alternative explanations for the finance 
exception: that financial coordination was being negotiated elsewhere; or that its absence 
was motivated by bank lobbying, seeking to protect their home markets.  
 
Alternative fora? 
There is some truth to the claim that financial market integration had been a topic for 
discussion between the US and EU in alternative fora.  Ironically, this was the result of a 
U-turn by U.S. regulators in the early 2000s over issues related to corporate governance, 
accounting standards, and securities markets regulations.  As Eliot Posner (2007, 2009) 
has argued, U.S. regulators were reluctant to make any concessions to support 
transatlantic financial regulatory cooperation until both the growth of transatlantic 
financial firms and the centralization of European regulatory authority made it attractive 
to do so.22  Once that happened during the Lamfalussy process, however, U.S. regulators 
were more than willing to make concessions to their European counterparts in order to 
foster greater coordination (see also Howarth and Quaglia, this issue). Indeed, US 
authorities repeatedly used this recent history of transatlantic institution-building as a 
primary rationale for the exclusion of financial services regulatory cooperation from 
TTIP. As we will show below though, this was not the primary reason for its absence 
from the TTIP negotiations. Instead, what we witness with TTIP is also apparent in other 
multilateral fora: that is, the absence or paucity of transatlantic regulatory coordination on 
financial market integration following the global financial crisis.23 
In broad terms, global financial cooperation between the EU and US had been discussed 
within the G 20, the Financial Stability Board, and the Basel Committee on Banking 
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Supervision. More specifically, a US-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue 
(FMRD) had been established in 2003 to promote financial market policy cooperation. 
Yet the post-crisis period has been characterized by ‘extraterritorial, duplicative or 
discriminatory’, unilateral policymaking on both sides of the Atlantic.24 Indeed, even the 
Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue was only designed to be an informal dialogue. 
And although US trade negotiators contended that this was sufficient, as we will argue 
below both EU authorities and EU-US financial firms contended that informal dialogue 
did not equal regulatory cooperation.25 As Edward Bowles, regional head of Standard 
Chartered Bank (Europe) and member of the EU Commission’s TTIP advisory group 
claimed, ‘the Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue [had] failed’.26  
What was apparent was that the FMRD had been relegated to merely a talking shop, a 
forum for the exchange of ideas.27 In part, this reflected concern in the United States that 
the EU was incapable of resolving its multiple (banking, sovereign debt, and growth) 
crises. As Michael Froman, the US trade representative, put it, ‘if TTIP is seen as a way 
for Europe to export its way out of its problems, it won’t have support…It’s got to be part 
of an overall effort to promote reform and get their economies moving again’.28  
 
Rival firms? 
A second alternative explanation for the absence of financial regulation from TTIP is that 
rival firms on either side of the Atlantic lobbied their respective authorities to ensure its 
exclusion from negotiations. There are two reasons why this was not the case however. 
First, US trade negotiators were explicit from early on in the negotiations that they agreed 
that financial market access should indeed be discussed as part of the TTIP agreement.29 
What they rejected was a formal agreement on mutual recognition and common 
regulations, as we will explain below. Secondly though, insurmountable evidence from 
financial firms and trade associations on both sides of the Atlantic points to their desire 
for financial regulatory coordination to be included in TTIP. For example, in March 2014, 
fifteen US and EU financial trade associations and representative bodies signed an 
official statement in support of the inclusion of financial regulatory coordination, 
emphasizing that ‘the opposite approach – diverging and conflicting regulation – risks 
damaging global growth, job creation, and investment and may hinder the important 
advances in the effectiveness and strengthening of the new regulatory environment’.30 Put 
simply, neither alternative fora nor rival firms is a sufficiently robust explanation for the 
exemption of financial services regulatory coordination from the TTIP negotiations.  
 
Competing regulatory regimes 
Having briefly discussed the two alternative explanations outlined above, we now turn to 
the third section of the paper. Our argument unfolds in two parts. We begin by (i) 
substantiating the claim that the finance exception arose from US opposition, before (ii)  
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explaining the source of this opposition, namely the tougher approach of US authorities 
since the financial crisis and their perception that the EU was more susceptible to 
lobbying from large financial firms. Then in our fourth and final section of the paper we 
present the evidence of ‘venue-shopping’ which regulatory divergence between the US 
and the EU has given rise to. We conclude by suggesting that the faster and harder, yet 
isolationist, response by the US might result in regulatory arbitrage. This is not to deny 
that U.S. financial firms are unwilling to lobby the U.S. Congress or that they will have 
only limited success in their attempts to water down Dodd-Frank.  Rather our point is 
simply that promoting trans-Atlantic regulatory cooperation is part of a wider strategy to 
influence the financial regulatory environment that includes venue shopping in Europe. 
Or at least that is what the US Treasury is concerned about.  Hence we argue that finance 
was left out of the TTIP conversation from an early stage because of the staunch 
unwillingness of the US SEC and Treasury to play ball. Put simply, there was ‘stiff 
opposition from the US Treasury [in particular]…[fuelled by a] fear that the US might 
lose its sovereignty over regulation’.31 The result was that ‘protectionist sentiment and 
economic nationalism [certainly in the area of financial services integration] were fast 
replacing the wave of enthusiasm’ that characterized other areas of the TTIP 
negotiations.32  
 
Process-tracing US opposition 
As the first section of this paper showed, there were early attempts by the EU 
Commission and stakeholders involved in shaping the EU’s position papers to include 
coordination on financial services regulation. Showing the US authorities’ opposition is 
therefore relatively straightforward. A ‘leaked document’ from the EU Trade Policy 
Committee in May 2014 stipulated that in view of ‘the firm US opposition to include 
regulatory cooperation on financial services in TTIP’ the EU itself had withdrawn any 
commitments on financial services in the EU’s market access offer.33  
Though US authorities had been reluctant to discuss financial services cooperation from 
an early stage in the TTIP negotiations, their explicit rejection of any such inclusion came 
to a head following the 10-14th March 2014 meetings. It was at this round of negotiations 
that the European Commission tabled its specific services and investments proposals, to 
be included in Section VI. It raised a series of concerns for US authorities including 
explicit forms of mutual recognition and mutual reliance. With regards to mutual 
recognition, it stipulated that either party would commit to examine any measures which 
were seen to have a negative impact on the ability of market operators to provide 
financial services within the territory of both parties.  With regards to mutual reliance, 
amongst other things, the text stipulated that both parties would commit towards 
convergence of their respective regulatory and supervisory frameworks.34 In other words, 
both mutual recognition and mutual reliance would have constituted a much stronger 
form of coordination on financial regulatory policy.  
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From the US perspective, this effort to promote transatlantic financial regulatory 
convergence was a clear attempt by the EU to defend the interests of its financial sector 
and an attempt to undermine US regulation that was far in advance of similar EU rules.35 
Indeed, such concerns were also echoed by left-wing research units and politicians from 
continental Europe. The Corporate Europe Observatory for example suggested that this 
‘proposal [would] not only make it more difficult for the US authorities to regulate 
European banks, it could block needed reforms on both sides of the Atlantic’.36 Indeed, 
one Social Democrat MEP noted that the proposal would ‘give a competitive advantage 
to those [financial institutions] hailing from the side that applies the lightest touch to 
finance’.37 This prompted a response from the EU Commissioner for financial services, 
Michel Barnier, as he spoke at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (June 
13th 2014). He noted: ‘I understand there are concerns here…that financial services 
regulation in the TTIP would lead to a kind of unraveling of the Dodd-Frank and a kind 
of deregulation of financial services’.38 Yet he responded that his ‘objective [was] exactly 
the opposite, better and high-quality interoperable regulations’.39  
Nonetheless, whilst the US trade representatives acknowledged the need to ‘lock in 
existing and create new market openings for [US] financial services suppliers’, they 
stipulated that they would continue to ‘ensure that [the US] government retains full 
discretion to regulate the financial sector’.40 In other words, demonstrating that (i) US 
opposition to the inclusion of financial services was determinant is relatively 
straightforward. The remainder of this third part of the paper now focuses on outlining 
(ii) the ‘big picture’ of regulatory reforms in the EU and the US, before (iii) focusing 
specifically on the areas of derivatives and foreign access, and capital requirements.   
 
US moved ‘faster and harder’ 
The one, overarching concern that animated the US’ position throughout the TTIP 
negotiations was therefore to maintain any improvements to the stability of its domestic 
financial system. This overarching concern had played out in two important ways prior to 
the TTIP negotiations: one was that efforts to shore up US financial stability framed 
efforts to reduce the liability to the US system of foreign-owned banks. This concern also 
animated the extra-territoriality clauses of various pieces of EU legislation. But the US 
went further in this area, as we will show in the case of third-country provisions and 
derivatives. The other way in which the aim of improving domestic financial stability 
played out was in the implementation of Basel III capital requirements. Unlike its more 
agnostic stance in relation to Basel II, the US aggressively applied a stringent version of 
Basel III. The fact that the EU was then widely recognized to have watered down its 
implementation of the new Basel accord in response to industry lobbying only fuelled the 
US’ resolve not to allow regulatory coordination to be included in TTIP. Opposition from 
US authorities therefore stemmed primarily from a reticence to re-open the Dodd-Frank 
act to negotiation. “‘Our view’, indicated the US trade representative, ‘is that there is 
 13 
nothing that we should do, or are going to do through TTIP, that would weaken Dodd-
Frank’”.41 Simply, the US authorities believed that the EU was a more porous regulatory 
environment, and that too firm a commitment to regulatory coordination would result in a 
weakening of new US standards (see Young, this issue). 
Before we turn to these two examples though – third country provisions and Basel III – 
we begin by highlighting that it was not simply that the US had moved harder and faster 
in all areas that fuelled the finance exception. It was also the case that the US and EU had 
simply pursued uncoordinated approaches to post-crisis re-regulation. In these areas it 
was not that any one approach was tougher or ‘superequivalent’. These approaches 
simply reflected important differences in regulatory culture and structure of the domestic 
banking systems within the two blocs. But, just as these divergent approaches prompted 
financial firms to lobby for greater coordination, so the very existence of this divergence 
further set US and EU authorities at odds in a way that fuelled mutual mistrust.  
Throughout the negotiation process the EU Commission was at pains to emphasize that 
‘both the EU and the US are similarly advanced in overhauling financial regulation in 
response to the crisis and are implementing the same set of standards’.42 At least at face 
value the claim appeared valid. Table 4 shows the G-20 follow-up legislation in the US 
and the EU. In essence, both blocs had strengthened their regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks in response to the financial crisis and had incorporated G20 
recommendations into their respective federal legal regimes.  
 
Table 4: Overview of US & EU implementation of G20 agenda 
 
SUBJECT Dodd-Frank (US) EU 
Credit-rating 
agencies 
Upgrade of NRSRO regime Credit Rating Agencies 
Regulation 
Hedge Funds Title IV, amending 1940 
Investment Advisors Act 
Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers Directive (AIFMD) 
OTC Derivatives Title VII mandates central 
clearing and exchange trading of 
most OTC derivatives 
Similar rules in EU Market 
Infrstructure Regulation (EMIR) 
Price transparency 
of bonds, 
derivatives, 
commodities 
(Idem) Rules in draft MiFID II and 
MiFIR  
Short-selling - Short-selling regulation 
Basel III Consultation on implementation 
ongoing 
Implemented in CRD II, III, IV 
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Bank structure Volcker rules Liikaanen report, Vickers, 
member state rules 
Bank tax (Initially proposed, but scrapped) Financial transaction tax (FTT) 
in individual member states and 
through ‘enhanced cooperation’ 
Remuneration rules (Enhanced disclosure) CRD III and IV, AIFMD, CRA 1 
Bank resolution Broader powers for the FDIC 
through the Orderly Liquidation 
Authority 
Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (RRD), Single 
Resolution Mechanism 
Institutional 
aspects 
Financial Services Oversight 
Council (FSOC), Enhanced 
powers for the Federal Reserve, 
Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB), Federal 
Insurance Office 
European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs), Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
       (adapted from Lanoo 2013: 4) 
 
 
Yet the way in which each bloc had pursued re-regulation was almost entirely 
uncoordinated. As noted above, both the US and the EU took their lead from the G20 
agenda on financial regulatory and supervisory reform. The G20 set the target date of the 
end of 2012 for all members to have implemented their response to the global financial 
crisis. In the US, the response focused on one piece of legislation - the Dodd-Frank Act. 
In the EU, multiple pieces of supranational legislation and often competing national 
reforms slowly emerged. The divergent approaches pursued by the two blocs are 
particularly apparent in four main areas, related to bank taxation; bank structure; 
remuneration rules; and short-selling.43  
In the area of bank taxation, the US proposed a bank balance sheet tax which was 
subsequently withdrawn during the drafting of Dodd-Frank. In the EU however, under 
the enhanced cooperation initiative 11 member states have agreed to implement a 
transaction tax of 0.1% on the value of secondary market equity and bond transactions, 
and 0.01% on derivatives. In the area of bank structure the Volcker rule, limiting 
proprietary trading, came into effect in July 2012. This was a particularly tough rule 
which effectively prohibited banks from engaging in an extensive list of activities that 
could be classified as trading on their own account and solely for profit. In Europe 
however, the EU Commission has struggled to introduce a separation of higher risk 
trading activities, in part because of the range of divergent or weaker national reforms 
introduced in the UK, France, and Germany.44 In relation to remuneration, new rules 
have been established in the EU under the various Capital Requirements Directives. No 
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such rules have been introduced in the US though. Finally, in the area of short-selling the 
EU regulation was introduced to cover the range and diversity of practices within Europe. 
It prohibits uncovered short sales in shares and sovereign debt securities. The US is less 
strict on uncovered short sales, but gives more discretion to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in handling them. In sum, in these four areas the issue was not so 
much which approach was tougher, it was simply that they were different – and these 
differences were unattractive to many of the larger firms. The costs associated with this 
divergence were a cause of concern to the banking industry, just as the divergence 
prompted US and EU authorities to defend their respective arrangements at the expense 
of enhanced coordination.  
These divergent approaches alone are not however sufficient explanation for the finance 
exception in TTIP. If they had been, it would seem rather odd that the EU had pressed so 
hard for financial services coordination to be included in the negotiations. Instead, what 
we need is an explanation for the US’ fears that Dodd-Frank would be watered down and 
that the EU was a more porous lobbying venue. These two elements are best explained by 
looking at third country provisions and derivatives, and capital adequacy requirements.  
 
Derivatives and foreign access 
As noted above, the overarching aim of improving the stability of the domestic financial 
system led the US to reduce its potential liability to costs associated with foreign 
institutions. This approach influenced the US’ regulation of derivatives. The September 
2009 G20 summit made a commitment to improve the transparency and safety of 
derivatives markets. The Summit Declaration stated, ‘all standardized OTC derivatives 
should be traded on exchanges…cleared through central counterparties…and reported to 
trade repositories’.45 In the US, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank act and in the EU the 
European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive 2 (MiFID 2), sought to apply these principles. Though the EU was 
the first of the two blocs to announce its intention to regulate OTC derivatives in 2009 the 
US moved further and faster than EU authorities in this area.  
There were clear difficulties for foreign firms simply by virtue of the inconsistent 
approaches employed by the two blocs.  These differences are apparent in the target 
groups (in the US: all market participants, whilst in the EU: non-financial entities are 
only included above certain thresholds); the product categories covered by the rules; the 
applicable disclosure requirements; and the obligations incumbent on central trading 
platforms and counterparties.46 Yet there was also evidence that the US pursued a 
particularly stringent approach in its treatment of non-domestic financial infrastructures. 
An especially noticeable example was that non-US banks trading with US counterparties 
are now required to register as swap dealers and operate according to rules set by the 
CTFC on capital requirements and risk management. This provoked an immediate 
response from non-US swap dealers who argued that the legal costs of such a requirement 
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would essentially act as a major disincentive to dealing with US counterparts.47 
The US’ approach to foreign firms in the area of derivatives was also reproduced in other 
post-crisis reforms. One of these areas related to the treatment of subsidiaries of foreign 
banks operating in the US. This is because, from a European perspective, ‘draft US rules 
on Foreign Banking Organisations…do not recognise non-US prudential rules [and 
therefore] they discriminate against non-US banks’.48 One notable example has been the 
capital and regulatory requirements applied to non-US banks. In February 2014, the US 
introduced particularly controversial additional requirements on foreign banks which, if 
conducting US-based non-branch banking operations with total assets of $50billion are 
required to set up an Intermediate Holding Company. The implication is that these 
holding companies would be forced to meet specific capital, regulatory and liquidity 
requirements that would involve restructuring their US operations. In effect these criteria 
could require much larger amounts of capital and liquidity to be held in the US than 
would otherwise be necessary to comply with global financial or regulatory rules.49 In a 
sense this was an attempt to ‘ring-fence’ foreign banks’ American operations, rather than 
allowing them to rely on their parent banks’ buffers.50 According to one senior banker 
though, this American rule ‘lets loose the dogs of protectionism, of Balkanisation’.51  
The banks that would be most exposed to the American rule would be Deutsche Bank, 
Credit Suisse, Barclays, UBS, HSBC, BNP Paribas, and RBS. The extent of their 
exposure largely depends on the percentage of their assets held in one of their American 
subsidiaries. This figure ranges from thirty-eight percent (Deutsche Bank) down to nine 
percent (RBS).52 The Dodd-Frank Act had earlier required foreign-owned bank holding 
companies to meet the same capital requirements as their American-owned peers. In 
response to this earlier measure Barclays and Deutsche Bank had shifted their big 
American operations out of their holding companies and into more lightly regulated 
structures. The new Intermediate Holding Company rule was therefore the US 
authorities’ attempt to close this kind of loophole.53 Simply, due to ‘efforts by a small 
number of very large foreign banks to evade the intent of Congress that capital standards 
apply to their U.S. Operations’, the US authorities felt the need ‘to create this structural 
requirement’.54  
In sum, the new US requirements placed on foreign banks were motivated by a suspicion 
that foreign governments of large international firms would not necessarily be able to 
provide a sufficiently robust backstop to their banks’ operations in the US. As Daniel 
Tarullo, Federal Reserve governor, suggested ‘We have to recognize that notwithstanding 
all the international cooperation…we do retain the responsibility to maintain the U.S. 
financial system, as do our brethren in jurisdictions around the world maintain their 
responsibilities for their own’.55 The result however, in keeping with the big theme of this 
article concerning the breakdown in trust and coordination between EU and US 
regulatory, was what EU authorities perceived to be ‘discriminatory measures which 
would have the effect of treating European banks worse than U.S. Ones’.56 As we will 
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show in the coming sections however, this was not simply a protectionist response 
targeted at foreign banks. The US authorities displayed an equally hostile approach to its 
own domestic banks in its bid to improve domestic financial stability. And it was the 
defense of this tougher approach that framed the US’ suspicions about including financial 
regulatory coordination in TTIP. 
   
Capital requirements & weakening of EU position 
The fact that the US authorities adopted an equally tough approach to their own domestic 
banks is perhaps best demonstrated in the application of Basel III capital requirements. 
Further, it was the weaker implementation of Basel III by the EU that gave rise to the US’ 
concerns about the EU being more susceptible to industry lobbying. The new Basel III 
capital rules have considerably raised the capital requirements applicable in both the EU 
and the US. Under the new requirements the loss- absorbing Tier 1 capital ratio must be 
raised from 4% to 6% and, below that, Core Tier 1 capital has to be increased from 2% to 
4.5%.57 All banks will also be required to hold a capital conservation buffer of common 
equity amounting to 2.5 percentage points as a countercyclical capital cushion. On top of 
that, a capital surcharge of between 1 and 3.5 percentage points is being introduced for 
global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).58  
Yet there were important differences in the implementation of the Basel rules, 
particularly as a result of industry lobbying in the EU. In the US, the Basel III rules 
constitute the most comprehensive overhaul of US bank capital standards in over two 
decades. The final rule was approved in July 2013 by the three US banking regulators: 
the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Part of what was particularly 
controversial about the US’ approach was that the Federal Reserve proposed to apply 
Basel III and other enhanced prudential standards to any intermediate holding company 
(IHC) that a large foreign banking organization would be required to establish for its US 
banking and non-banking subsidiaries. But the US Basel III rule also applies to the entire 
US banking sector, from community banks to regional banks, to the largest US SIFIs. Put 
simply, the Federal Reserve decided to implement capital requirements that were 
substantively stricter than under Basel norms.59 What was equally important – for the 
purposes of our argument here – is that whilst the community and midsize banks won 
certain concessions through their lobbying efforts, the largest banks were largely 
unsuccessful in softening the proposal and, in fact, face additional requirements.60 When 
delivering the reforms for example, Governor Dan Tarullo noted that whilst the Basel 
Rule would mark the end of major capital reforms for ‘the vast majority of banks’, the 
eight US Globally Systemically Important Banks would face additional capital initiatives. 
These would involve a supplemental leverage ratio above the Basel III minimum; another 
proposal concerning the amount of equity and long-term bail-in debt these firms should 
maintain; and a further potential rule to consider possible approaches to calculating 
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additional requirements for firms which rely heavily on wholesale funding. As the Fed 
explained, though the ‘proposed rule [was] generally consistent with the Basel 
Committee’s standard…it [was] more stringent in several areas’.61  
In contrast, in the EU there was clear evidence that the Basel III rules had been diluted, 
and largely in response to the lobbying efforts of European banks (Howarth & Quaglia, 
this issue). When the Basel Committee published its reports on compliance of rules in 
December 2014 it stated that the EU was ‘materially non-compliant with the minimum 
standards prescribed under the Basel framework’ whereas the US was ‘largely compliant’ 
and all other jurisdictions reviewed were ‘compliant’.62 In other words, the EU was 
perceived to be a ‘global laggard’.63 In the EU’s case, two areas were highlighted by the 
Basel Committee. The first was that the Capital Requirements Regulation allows for 
certain exemptions from capital requirements for credit valuation adjustment (CVA) risk 
and the second was the possibility to permanently exempt certain exposures from internal 
ratings based approaches .64 
But the Basel report also flagged areas of deviation in the EU’s ‘definition of capital and 
calculation of minimum capital requirements’ which revealed concessions made to 
French and German banking groups. In relation to large French banks, the treatment of 
insurance subsidiaries was flagged; whilst German banks had gained concessions in the 
area of capital for cooperative banks.65 In relation to the earlier Basel III negotiation 
process French authorities had opposed the implementation of the rules with regard to 
banks with insurance companies, which would have particularly affected Societe 
Generale and Credit Agricole.66 German authorities had also joined their French 
counterparts in pushing back the deadline to disclose leverage ratios and on efforts to 
phase out hybrid forms of capital that were important to German public banks.67 A 
Franco-German statement argued that the stringency of Basel rules would harm lending 
capacity and harm the real economy.68  
Essentially, private sector arguments that stringent capital requirements would slow 
economic recovery resonated with national and European authorities – particularly given 
the struggles the Eurozone was experiencing in restoring economic growth. The result 
was that in both the final Basel III rules and, more particularly, in the final EU Capital 
Requirements Directive and Regulation the continental European bank lobby succeeded 
in achieving certain concessions. Although the new Basel accord included an effective 
tier one capital requirement of 7 per cent of risk-weighted assets, its phase-in was pushed 
back to last until 2018.69 Yet the precarious economic situation led European authorities 
to be especially accommodating to demands from their private sector actors, particularly 
in relation to the leverage ratio, which would only be ‘tested’ until 2017. This was clearly 
related to demands from the German and French banks, which were simply incapable of 
meeting more stringent requirements.70  
In sum, the experience of the implementation of Basel III capital requirements was 
particularly important for US authorities. It fundamentally shaped their conclusion that 
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the EU was more porous and susceptible to private sector lobbying. This perception was 
supported by certain hard facts such as the reality that new capital requirements were 
substantively lower in the EU than in the US. Whereas a key minimum common equity 
capital or leverage ratio had been made binding in the US, this was not the case in the EU 
law; and the leverage ratios of large euro-area banks tended to be 1% lower than those of 
their US peers.71 These considerations were an important factor shaping the lack of trust 
US authorities placed in including financial regulation in TTIP.  
 
Venue-shopping 
In this fourth and final section of the article we present evidence of venue-shopping by 
the largest financial firms. In short, the divergent approaches have raised three big issues: 
that of market access to the respective host bloc; that of the cost-burden of duplicative 
regulatory requirements; and that in the all-important details of many of these regulatory 
initiatives the US has pursued a different (and arguably tougher) approach than European 
regulators. The result has been that financial services firms have invested a lot of 
resources in lobbying to have finance included in the TTIP negotiations. According to 
data from the Corporate Europe Observatory, of the 32 sectors that lobbied the EU 
Commission up until July 2014, financial firms were the 7th most active.72 More 
important however, is the evidence that EU negotiators’ consistent pressure to have 
financial services included in TTIP stemmed in large part from the lobbying of both 
European and US banks at the European level. Put simply, EU firms have been 
particularly concerned about market access issues arising from tougher US requirements; 
whilst US firms have been primarily concerned about the cost-burden associated with 
duplicative regulatory requirements. Regulatory divergence however, of which the 
finance exception in TTIP is just one example, has therefore created openings for firm 
lobbying and regulatory arbitrage.  
Evidence of the lobbying activity of European banks and financial trade associations to 
have regulatory cooperation and market access issues included in the scope of the TTIP 
negotiations is abundant.73 From continental Europe the main proponents of this inclusion 
have been the largest banks with the highest exposure to the US market, and therefore the 
most to lose. Deutsche Bank is perhaps the most obvious example. Its higher leverage 
ratio, greater reliance on short-term borrowing for its US operations, and higher reliance 
on proprietary mathematical models to reduce risk-weighted assets were particularly 
susceptible to the changes in the US regulatory regime outlined in the second section of 
this paper.74 There is also however, extensive evidence of British firms and the City of 
London lobbying both domestic and European authorities to have finance included in 
TTIP.75 
Evidence of efforts by US firms to have financial services included in TTIP begins with 
their concerns with the expansive and stringent scope of their own new, domestic 
regulatory regime. In December 2013 for example, the International Swaps and 
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Derivatives Association (ISDA), the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA), and the Institute of International Bankers launched a lawsuit 
against the US Commodity Futures and Trading Commision (CTFC).76 The trade 
associations claimed that ‘in the guise of “guidance,”…[the CTFC had promulgated] an 
expansive new body of regulations under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) that seeks to extend the CFTC’s authority and 
requirements across the globe’. As a result, the financial associations indicated that this 
‘flawed attempt’ would ‘harm investors, impair US and foreign businesses, impose 
inconsistent, duplicative requirements on firms that are regulated by other nations’.77 In 
turn they claimed that the attempt ‘exceeded the CTFC’s lawful authority’ (ibid.) and 
risked imposing ‘a series of rules that are contrary to the spirit and the letter of 
international cooperation and may harm global markets’.78 As noted above in relation to 
derivatives clauses included in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, this was precisely the 
kind of expansive and stringent activity which industry had feared would occur as a result 
of new powers afforded US authorities in the text of Dodd-Frank. The extraterritorial 
effect of post-crisis US regulation was not simply an issue for foreign firms but also for 
domestic firms.79 
For these financial trade associations the fact that policymakers appeared to have made a 
commitment to pursue commensurable regulatory changes in the area of OTC derivatives 
was sufficient grounds to challenge the isolationist stance taken by the CTFC. In their 
position paper they cited the CTFC—EC joint statement of July 11th 2013. They noted 
that in a document entitled ‘Path Forward’, the authorities had explicitly emphasized that 
since these markets were international, and not withstanding the high degree of similarity 
in emerging regulatory requirements on both sides of the Atlantic, ‘without coordination, 
subjecting the global market to the simultaneous application of each other’s requirements 
could lead to conflicts of law, inconsistencies, and legal uncertainty’.80 Indeed, the EU 
Commission had stated that it was ‘very surprised by the latest CTFC rules which 
seem…to go against both the letter and spirit of the path forward agreement’.81  
Yet there is also clear evidence that US firms have massively increased the sums they 
spend on lobbying in Europe. Under new EU disclosure rules for example, Goldman 
Sachs revealed that it had spent between €700,000-€790,000 on lobbying in Brussels in 
2014, compared to an estimated €50,000 in 2013.82 This was the largest increase among 
the US firms. Yet other firms reported even larger amounts spent on lobbying in Brussels, 
the difference being that these amounts were more consistent with spending in previous 
years: JPMorgan Chase estimated that it had spent between €1.3-€1.5million in 2014; and 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association estimated that Brussels lobbying 
activities had cost them €2.5-€3million in 2014.83 Though these figures are still 
significantly less than the comparable amounts these same firms spend on lobbying their 
(domestic) US authorities, they point to the increased importance US firms are placing on 
representing their interest in the EU reform process.84 In sum, our claim in this section is 
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that unpredictable and stringent behaviour of the US authorities, coupled with the more 
cooperative stance of the EU authorities, provided the necessary opening for US firms to 
(also) direct their lobbying efforts at the EU.85 
  
Conclusions  
This paper has argued that financial services had been systematically excluded from the 
TTIP negotiations due to US opposition. This US opposition stemmed from a belief that 
they had moved faster and harder in their post-crisis response than the EU authorities; 
and that US authorities feared that the EU was a more porous regulatory environment and 
thus more susceptible to large private sector lobbying. The US decision to move harder 
and faster was motivated by domestic financial stability concerns. It gave rise to both a 
tougher treatment of their respective domestic firms as well as a tightening of market 
access and tougher requirements placed on foreign firms.86  In an odd way, however, this 
isolationist policy has unwound a pattern of regulatory convergence that was the hallmark 
of the 2000s without eliminating the large trans-Atlantic financial institutions that grew 
up in the same period.87  The U.S. Treasury seeks to return to a more isolationist 
regulatory posture and yet the institutions it must regulate have a more global outlook.  
Now those financial institutions are looking to enlist support abroad in their efforts to 
restart trans-Atlantic coordination.  And they are pushing on an open door in Europe.  
This is not to say that there is truth in the concern among Treasury officials that European 
regulators are more porous; it would be enough if European regulators and trans-Atlantic 
financial firms found a common interest in regulatory convergence.  The Treasury and the 
SEC may hold out against the inclusion of finance in TTIP, but it will have a hard time 
reasserting the primacy of American financial regulation in the same way it could in the 
1980s and 1990s.  
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